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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, Supreme Court No. 44155 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, Owyhee District Court No. CV-2014-0278 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING 
as Trustee of the HEART K F~A.NCH TRUST 
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO 
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON 
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Defendants/Respondents. 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee , and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Counterdefendants. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for the State of Idaho, 
In and for Owyhee County 
Honorable Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge, Presiding 
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525, ext. 103 
Matthew. Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
I Ronald P. Rainey, ISB #1022 
Attorney at Law · 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestoffice.net 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Respondent Kings 
S. Bryce Farris, ISB #5636 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bi:yce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
Lows 
DEC O 5 2016 
Table Contents 
IL ARGUMENTS....................................................................................... . ....................... 4 
A. There are Disputed Issues of Material Facts .................................. ........................ .4 
B. Reasonable Inferences Support Fuquay's Arguments ........................................... 5 
1. How Did the Roadway Begin? .............................................................................. 6 
2. Was the Fuquay's Use "In Common with the General Public"? ....................... 7 
3. Was there Evidence of Independent Adverse Actions? ...................................... 9 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ..................................................................................................... 10 
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 11 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2710 
SEATTLE, 'WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525 
Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402,404 (1979)........... . .... 4 
Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619,624 (1999) .......................................... 10 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006) ......................................... 8 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979) ....... 10 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941) ,,,,,,,, .. ,,,,,, .. ,,,, ............................ 7 
Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929-30, 277 P.3d 374, 
376-77 (2012) ........................................................................................................................ 4 
Statutes 
LC. 12-121 ................................................................................................................................ 10 
I.C. 55-104 .................................................................................................................................. 7 
Other Authorities 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ..................................................................................... 7 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2710 
SEATTLE, WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525 
I. 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues 
as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether an issue of material fact is in dispute, facts should be 
liberally construed in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought and all 
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. A motion for summary judgment must be 
denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if 
reasonable men might reach different conclusions. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 
P.2d 402,404 (1979). 
The question for this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the Lows and the Kings. This court reviews the record de novo. In doing so, the 
Court must determine if there are disputed issues of material fact, and, when the facts and 
inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the Fuquays, could a reasonable person 
find in favor of the Fuquays? If so, then the trial court's Judgment must be reversed and the 
matter remanded for trial. 
II. ARGUMENTS 
A. There are Disputed Issues of Material Facts 
Because this Court exercises de novo review of a summary judgment ruling, the first 
question is whether there are any disputed issues of material fact. If there are, summary 
judgment is improper and the case should be remanded for trial. 
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material facts are disputed, a chart some the disputed testimony 
at 6, 
However, in doing so, the Kings and Lows invite the Court to weigh the disputed facts in 
favor of the Kings and Lows. Weighing disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party is 
improper for a summary judgment motion. All reasonable inferences from the facts must be 
construed in favor of the Fuquays, and against the Lows or Kings. 
When the disputed facts are properly construed against the Kings and Lows, and all 
reasonable inferences are properly construed in favor of the Fuquays, the facts do not support 
summary judgment. 
B. Reasonable Inferences Support Fuguay's Arguments 
If the disputed facts and inferences from those facts are properly construed in favor of 
the Fuquays, a reasonable person could find that: 
• The roadway had been used by the predecessors to the current parties by use of the 
roadway for nearly 100 years; 
• The origin of the roadway is unkno"'n and therefore is presumed to be adverse to the 
Kings and Lows; 
• Prescriptive rights to use the roadway had already been established for the benefit of 
the Fuquay property prior to 1973; 
• The Kings and Lows acquired their properties subject to the easement rights over the 
roadway; 
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Fuquays' purchase his property and placement a new mobile home in 1979 
on 
the roadway; 
• The Fuquays' and their renters' use of the roadway to access their homes was 
sufficiently distinct and adverse to establish the prescriptive easement; 
1. How Did the Roadway Begin? 
use 
It is important to distinguish between the existence of King Lane as an access road, 
and the improvements to the road surface that the Kings began in 1973. While the Lows and 
Kings focus on the improvements to the roadway that the Kings made in 1973, they offered no 
evidence of how the roadway was actually created and established before the Kings purchased 
the property in 1973. The testimony from Sam Steiner was that the access road had been 
there since before he was born in 1959. R 237 (Declaration of Samuel V.C. Steiner at ,I 5). 
The testimony from Rose King was that the fence lines had been in existence since the 
property was surveyed in the late 1800s. R 574. Deposition of Rose King at 15-16. 
In the absence of evidence as to how the roadway was created (as opposed to how it 
was improved), the burden of showing that Fuquays' use wa.s permissive shifted to the Kings 
and the Lows. The Kings and Lows presented no evidence that the Fuquays' use was 
permissive. Based on the testimony in the record, a reasonable person could conclude that the 
origin of the roadway is unknown. The use of the roadway for access is, therefore, presumed 
adverse regardless of when the Kings began to improve the road surface. A reasonable person 
could conclude that the roadway was in existence for nearly 100 years, and that prescriptive 
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use rights vested before property to 
1 
The Kings and Lows argue that the use of the roadway by the Fuquays was "in 
common" with the Kings and the Lows. However, the correct issue is whether the Fuquays 
use was "in common with the general public." An individual using land as a road in 
common with the general public cannot acquire a prescriptive right of way against the O\\'Iler. 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). 
According to the Kings and Lows, any use by the general public means that there can 
be no prescriptive rights. The Kings and Lows are incorrect because that is not what "in 
common" means. The phrase "in common" means equal or undivided. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "in common" as: "Shared equally with others, undivided into separately 
owned parts." IN COMMON, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). I.C. 55-104 states: 
"Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is an interest in common, 
unless acquired by them in partnership, for partnership purposes, or unless declared in its 
creation to be a joint interest, or unless acquired as community property." 
Thus, it is not simply whether the general public ever used the roadway. For use to be 
"in common with the general public," the Kings and Lows must prove that the Fuquays' use 
of the roadway was no different than, or was equal to, use by the general public. The Kings 
and Lows must show that the general public used the roadway, and that the Fuquays' use of 
the roadway was indistinguishable from the general public. If the Kings and Lows do that, 
then the burden shifts to the Fuquays to show an independent adverse use that is 
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use use public 1s 
In this case, the Kings and Lows never established "use in common with the general 
public." At the very least, it is a disputed issue of fact. While the undisputed testimony 
established that the Fuquays used the road for regular residential access since 1977, Rose 
King testified that the general public did not use the roadway: 
Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other delivery 
services of King Lane to provide services to Fuquay properties. To the contrary, the 
mailboxes for the Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not 
observed any services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay 
properties ... .I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access 
the Fuquay properties. 
R 232. Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014. 
A. Let me tell you one thing before you go too far. If you're looking at the picture, if 
you're going to drive across our bridge and you don't know that there's a lane that goes 
to the left, you're going to come directly into my yard. We had that. We told people 
where they wanted to go. They turned around and went back. So most of the people 
that I would have came or ifthere was a hunter, as you have asked before, then they 
would ask. 
Q. Okay. So if somebody didn't know that the road took the left tum after the bridge to 
go out there, they would have usually ended up in your driveway? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then they would have either said, "Oops, sorry," turned around and left, or if 
they were looking for somebody they might have stopped and asked? Is that a fair 
statement? 
A. Yes. And we would have told them how they went to get there. 
R 576-577 (Rose King Deposition at 25-26). 
Rose King's own testimony puts her testimony clearly at odds with "use in common 
with the general public." Because the Lows and Fuquays did not establish use in common 
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the judgment is improper. the least, a trier of fact must 
use 
3. Was there Evidence oflndependent Adverse Actions? 
The Kings argue that the roadway came into existence in 1973 when the Kings began 
improving the roadway. However, the testimony shows that the Kings were improving an 
existing roadway, not creating a new one. The roadway itself already existed in 1973 and had 
perhaps existed for over 100 years - the Kings just improved it and made it better. Thus, the 
King's argument that the Fuquays used the improved roadway surface in common with the 
general public is irrelevant if the prescriptive rights to use the roadway for access had already 
vested before the 1973 improvements. The Fuquays could have continued to use the roadway 
for access as a matter of right, regardless of whether the roadway surface had been improved 
by the Kings. 
Even if the court were to find that the origin of the roadway was undisputed, or that the 
roadway was created in 1973, the next question is whether the Fuquays presented any 
evidence of an independent adverse act that put the roadway owners on notice of the Fuquays' 
intent to use the roadway. The Kings and Lows argue that the first adverse use of the 
roadway was in 2011 when the Fuquays began using the roadway for large trucks. That is 
incorrect. The Fuquays' distinct adverse use began either: 1) in 1977 when Jim Fuquay 
purchased his property and began using the roadway, or 2) the placement of the mobile home 
by Jim Fuquay in 1979 and subsequent use of the roadway for access to the home. The 2011 
use by the Fuquays might be relevant to the scope of the easement, but not whether the 
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easement had been established then. Further, Fuquays are entitled to 
use onto use so use 
The Kings and Lows minimize Fuquay's arguments about the placement of the new 
mobile home by Jim Fuquay in 1979 and the subsequent use of the roadway by various 
renters. However, a reasonable person could conclude that the placement of new mobile 
home in 1979, and the use of the roadway by the Fuquays and their renters after that point in 
time, was sufficient to put the Kings and Low predecessors on notice of the Fuquays' adverse 
claim of right to use the roadway. The Kings and Lows may disagree whether those acts were 
sufficiently distinct, but that is an issue of fact that must be weighed and determined at trial. It 
is not an issue of law that can be decided without weighing the evidence. Therefore, it cannot 
be determined on summary judgment. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES 
The Lows and Kings argue that they are entitled to attorney fees under LC. 12-121. 
However, unless otherwise provided for by statute or by contract, "attorney fees will only be 
awarded when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Minich v. Gem State Developers, 
Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). Attorney fees will not be awarded 
where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law is 
presented, even if the arguments are not persuasive. Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 
979 P .2d 619, 624 (1999). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 10 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2710 
SEATTLE, WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525 
case, are factual dispute and substantive arguments on whether 
not 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Kings and Lows. 
The Kings and Lows did not establish that the Fuquays' use of the roadway was "in common 
with the general public." There are disputed issues of material fact, the trial court did not 
construe reasonable inferences in favor of the Fuquays, and a reasonable person could find in 
favor of Fuquays. The trial court's Judgments must be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial. 
Dated: November 29, 2016 
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Matthew R. Cleverle , SB #5418 
Fidelity National aw oup 
701 Fifth Avenu Suite 710 
Seattle, WA 981 
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Matthew.Cleverley(Cl{fnf.com 
Attorney for Appellant/Fuquays 
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SERVICE 
On the date given below, I caused to be served 2 Bound Copies of Appellants' Reply 
Brief and an electronic copy on the following individuals by the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey I Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-744 7 
b!)'ce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
Dated: December 2, 2016. 
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